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C

HAIM Saiman’s book Halakhah: The Rabbinic Idea of Law1 describes
halakhah as a dialectic integration of regulatory and expressive modalities, a discourse that not only conveys legal norms but also shapes
thought, communicates social and religious values, and explores enduring
human questions. Saiman argues that this integration of the regulatory
and the expressive in Jewish law was encouraged by two features that set
halakhah apart from state-based legal regimes. First, halakhah came of
age in the period of the Mishnah and Talmud, after the demise of Jewish
sovereignty; as a result, it contains a great deal of non-applied or onceapplied law. Second, the ideal of Talmud Torah, or study for its own sake
rather than for concrete application, was a central aspect of halakhah’s
practice and a foundational religious requirement. The integration of the
regulatory and the expressive explains many of the distinctive features of
halakhah: the mix of legal and non-legal genres (halakhah and aggadah)
in the Talmud, the curious turns of the Talmud’s dialogue, and the
rabbinic devotion to the painstaking elaboration of even defunct or nonapplied law.
The book offers a phenomenological study of halakhah as the playing
out of the tension between these two poles. Illustrating his thesis with
wonderful examples from late ancient to modern times, Saiman locates
various scholars, schools, and communities on the continuum between
those who hold a more static conception of halakhah as regulatory, and
those who hold a more dynamic conception of halakhah as Torah—which
in this context refers to a discourse to be studied. The book’s chapters
show that although the period following the close of the Talmud saw a
movement towards halakhah-as-law, the pull of halakhah-as-Torah, continued to register. Saiman writes: “whether our point of reference is the Talmud, the Codes, the commentaries, or the responsa, the result is
substantially the same. Halakhah is concurrently a system of governing
rules and practices, a forum for legal analysis, a platform of religious expression, and an object of devotional study.”2
In a final chapter, Saiman argues that the core features he has traced
make halakhah ill-suited to serve as the legal-system of a modern state.
State laws are ideally flat, unambiguous, static, and predictable, but the
Talmud and the religious calling of Talmud Torah favor dynamic legal
* Robert F. and Patricia Ross Weis Professor of Religious Studies, Yale
University.
1. CHAIM N. SAIMAN, HALAKHAH: THE RABBINIC IDEA OF LAW (2018).
2. Id. at 194.
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argument, literary nuance, and cultural exploration over black-letter rules.
Halakhah contains hyperbolic statements and linguistic imprecision that
can be dangerous if treated as black letter law, as well as aspirational elements that cannot be enforced. It also places limits on its own operation,
so as to almost be disabled as a system of governance, but then conversely
fails to reign in what Saiman refers to as “sub-halakhah”—extra-halakhic
practices and customs adopted and applied as time and opportunity required. Saiman sketches briefly the proper role of halakhah in a Jewish
state by contrasting it to its improper role: “when halakhic authority is an
artifact of state law rather than an autonomous cultural norm, the result is
inevitably frustration and disenchantment on all sides . . . a brute mechanism of state power”3—words that might just as well have been uttered by
Moses Mendelssohn or even Baruch Spinoza. In more positive terms,
Saiman writes: “If, as we argued above, halakhic regulation is ideally encountered in a holy space where regulation, education, and religious reflection converge, then imposing halakhah through state law falls short on
every account.”4 In nuce, and to invoke Robert Cover, the proper role of
halakhah in the Jewish state is paideic rather than imperial.
Saiman differentiates his work from the study of Talmud in academic
circles. He describes academic studies of the halakhah as committed to a
historical or a “still-shot” approach that understands each iteration of the
law in historical context.5 By contrast, the study of halakhah by lawyers—
which is often labelled a constructive or dogmatic approach6—approaches
Jewish law as a legal system structured by various propositions and analytical principles. However, while it is true that Saiman approaches the
halakhah as a system and seeks to unveil its most fundamental ideas, he
underestimates the extent to which his study is similar to recent work in
academic Jewish studies. Increasingly, scholars of Talmud and Jewish law
are charting a path between historicism and dogmatism, and producing
works of intellectual history. These works assume a basic conceptual coherence as they chart the development of some aspect or element of the
halakhah. Thus, Saiman’s narrative of the very idea of law in rabbinic culture will be a welcome addition to the library of any Jewish studies
academic.
In one important respect, however, Saiman’s work does differ from
similar studies in the academy. Saiman provides an almost entirely immanent account that privileges an unfolding inner logic when explaining or
charting the development of law and minimizes the effect of historical
context. While it is true that certain characteristic features or qualities
inherent in halakhah are engines of halakhah’s story, it is also true that no
legal system develops in historical isolation. The story of any legal system’s
3. Id. at 241.
4. Id. at 240–41.
5. Id. at 13.
6. Joseph E. David, Divinity, Law, and the Legal Turn in the Study of Religions, 32
J.L. & RELIGION 172 (2017).
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development is necessarily a mix of inherent principles, doctrines, and
ideas that unfold naturally and contingent historical factors and interactions that exert pressure on or shape the path of its development. Saiman
states, however, that he is not interested in the historical question of how
and why the rabbis’ idea of law developed as it did. He confines himself to
the phenomenological question: what was the effect of this understanding
of halakhah? And to answer the question, Saiman reaches for the contrast
between analytical philosophy and literature.
Saiman explains that the goal of philosophy’s analytical inquiry is to
approach a subject in the purest and most abstract form possible, free of
distracting contingencies.7 The philosopher works through reason alone,
downplaying reliance on specific laws, histories, and traditions. Literature
works from the opposite perspective. To understand a work of literature
one must inhabit the plot, characters, and symbols. Any detail can shed
light on how the novel is to be read. Saiman asserts that the Talmud is
more like literature than analytic philosophy because it resists detached
inquiry and is difficult to universalize.8 And yet, Talmud is not exactly like
literature since Talmud speaks in the legislative tone and literature does
not. It is a curious sui generis combination.
The philosophy/literature contrast is wonderfully instructive but it
leaves us wondering why the rabbis chose the path of literature instead of
philosophy? I submit that Saiman’s phenomenological analysis would
have greater power, and the stakes of the rabbinic wager would be clearer
and sharper, if we allow ourselves to explore the larger cultural context
that conditioned and shaped the rabbis’ choice and made it so meaningful. This is where Saiman’s claims most closely intersect with my own recent work.9
The Mishnah emerged in Roman Palestine after a period of intensive
encounter with Greek and Roman ideas of law. The Talmuds of the Land
of Israel and Babylonia are also the products of a minority community
elaborating its native traditions at a time of great cultural ferment and
interaction. When viewed in historical context, the dialectic interplay of
regulatory and expressive modalities at the heart of halakhah is revealed as
more than an interesting cultural phenomenon with important effects; it
is a profound act of resistance to an alternative epistemology.
Saiman actually takes us a good way down this path in chapter 4
where he describes the conflict between Torah and philosophical inquiry
as a conflict over knowledge and the means by which knowledge is
processed and transmitted. As Saiman notes, Western tradition values sin7. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 138.
8. Id. at 139.
9. The ideas developed in the remainder of this Essay will be presented in
fuller form in my forthcoming monograph on play and humor in rabbinic law, but
for the nonce see my “Humor as Epistemic Barometer in Rabbinic Literature,”
seminar paper delivered at the AJS annual meeting, in Washington D.C., December, 2017.
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gle-authored works with a thesis supported by arguments running from
premise to claims to conclusion.10 No classical text of Jewish law or
thought works this way. None is single-authored, and the Sea of the Talmud is like “a network: a system where individual nodes can be arranged
and rearranged in multiple configurations, but that has no true beginning
middle or end.”11 There is “perpetual uncertainty as to the guiding direction” and “conversations . . . simply stop rather than conclude.”12
This is exactly correct, but again the question is why? Are these two ahistorically represented orientations (the orientations of philosophy and
of literature) simply inexplicable preferences, or can we push beyond the
phenomenological to the historical so as to understand better why the
rabbis approached halakhah as they did? I submit that we can and when
we do, the rabbinic idea of law is revealed as an intentional choice based
on a fundamental resistance to Greek ways of knowing, to Greek claims
about (divine) truth as a static abstraction divorced from the material
world. Viewed in its larger cultural context, the rabbinic idea of (divine)
law is not only an alternative idea of law; it is an alternative epistemology
and indeed, an alternative ontology.
I would argue that the Talmudic preoccupation with detail—often
trivial and impracticable—is a weapon in the rabbis’ arsenal against absolutist claims of certain knowledge. I recognize that this runs against the
conventional view that the baroque argumentation of the Talmud seeks to
ascertain knowledge by exhausting all possible alternatives, so I am delighted to see that Saiman joins me in the view that there is “perpetual
uncertainty as to the guiding direction” of a halakhic debate, and “conversations . . . simply stop rather than conclude.” But to understand how the
Talmud’s playful focus on detail disrupts the acquisition of certain knowledge requires a consideration of the epistemological function of detail as
propounded by ancient Greek culture.
For all their differences (and there are many), the theories of knowledge propounded by Plato and Aristotle had this in common: For both,
the object of true knowledge is the universal form or essence rather than
particular substance. This is because knowledge is knowledge of truth and
truth is immutable; since particular material substances are subject to
change, genuine knowledge cannot be of particulars, but must be of universal forms, essences, or concepts that are immaterial and metaphysically
real.13
The particular details of any given substance, which are a function of
its material substratum (its being a brown or white horse, a tall or short
10. Id. at 70.
11. Id. Saiman credits JONATHAN ROSEN, THE TALMUD AND THE INTERNET: A
JOURNEY BETWEEN TWO WORLDS (2001) with the analogy.
12. SAIMAN, surpa note 2, at 71.
13. An important difference between Aristotle and Plato is that the latter locates the universal forms in an independent, transcendent realm, access to which
is impeded by sensory perception of material particulars.
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horse), may distinguish that substance from other particular substances in
its class (horses), but such details do not contribute to an apprehension of
the universal form that unites and defines the class (horse-ness), and indeed certain details must be suppressed when seeking to identify and abstract the common essence that unites a group of particular substances.
Insofar as it aims at a unity beyond diversity, Greek epistemology deemed
a preoccupation with detail as an impediment to the acquisition of true
and certain knowledge.
Ancient Greek theories of knowledge focusing on the relation of the
particular to the universal, the detail to the whole, shed light on the epistemological revolution posed by the Talmudic sugya, and this is my claim:
where Greek epistemology sought to stabilize knowledge and achieve certainty through abstraction from detail, Talmudic epistemology sought to
destabilize knowledge and undermine certainty through distraction with
detail.
The scholarly consensus is that the Talmud’s detailed argumentation
is designed to bring more certainty; I disagree and on my reading of
Saiman’s book, he does too. The plethora of detail and the argumentative
meanderings are designed to bring less certainty and I submit that they do
so pointedly and intentionally. The Talmud’s seemingly endless scholasticism is an intentional reminder that divine law is infinite, because it can
never consider every possible case, condition, or variable detail, and so we
must never claim final certainty. The halakhah’s refusal in so many instances to arrive at a single definitive answer may be seen as a resistance to
epistemological certainty and static absolutes in the name of the dynamic,
the particular, the situational, the relational.
Halakhah is not represented in Talmudic argumentation as the mirror of a fixed transcendent reality and its categories do not point beyond
themselves to a static abstract truth. On the contrary, the play of halakhic
argumentation, for all its analytical conceptualization and rational rigor,
points towards and remains anchored in the ever-shifting details of this
world—with its creditors and debtors, its pots and pans—as the only reality. Halakhah requires an existential commitment to the dynamic and
world-sustaining contestation of all static absolutes.
If the rabbis’ commitment to excessive detail arises from, and is a sign
of, their resistance to epistemological certainty and static absolutes in the
name of the dynamic, the particular, the situational, the relational, then
the story of halakhah suffers a serious disruption with the methods of the
Brisker Yeshivah, as described in chapter 12. This disruption is obscured if
we adopt Saiman’s phenomenological lens only. On Saiman’s account,
the Brisker approach and the legal philosophy of R. Hayyim Soloveitchik
and his grandson R. Joseph Soloveitchik represent an extreme swing towards the halakhah-as-Torah/discourse pole. But viewed through a historicist lens, the Brisker approach stands revealed as a singular departure
from Talmudic epistemology and ontology. In other words, once we un-
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derstand that the rabbinic idea of law is a resistance to a dominant and
static conception of abstract truth transcending the human and material
world, the Brisker conception of halakhah emerges as a radical deviation
from the halakhah’s story. R. Hayyim Soloveitchik conceived of halakhah
as a transcendent and abstract reality that stands outside of time and history and served as “the blueprint for creation.”14 His grandson, R. Joseph
Soloveitchik analogized the halakhist to a mathematician or physicist because the propositions of halakhah are “true” regardless of the actual physical existence of the things they organize and govern, an “ideal
construction which . . . lasts forever.”15 As Saiman notes: “The idea that
halakhah predates creation means that its rules are hard-wired into the
fabric of the universe. . . . The halakhah that God studies with the angels
in heaven consists of objective principles beyond the reach of humans.”16
Soloveitchik, of course, earned a doctorate in philosophy and was
well-versed in Platonic and Aristotelian thought. He notes with admiration the Greek valorization of the abstract as the only ontological reality in
his Halakhic Man: “The common denominator of both the Platonic and
Aristotelian views is that the random and particular are not deemed worthy of being granted the status of the real and existent and remain in the
realm of chaos and the void.”17 Perhaps we should not be surprised that
he internalized these ideas and that he reformulated Talmudic epistemology and ontology to align with the classical Greek philosophy for which he
had developed an admiration. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that in this
respect Soloveitchik’s conception of halakhah, a conception that undergirds contemporary forms of Judaism that consider themselves deeply
“traditional,” has more in common with such Hellenized Jews as Philo, or
even the sectarians at Qumran (both of whom attributed some form of
ontological reality and immutability to the Torah) than with the rabbis of
the Talmud (who, in general, did not).
Certainly, insofar as the Brisker school invests considerable effort in
discerning the principles that animate the halakhah’s internal structure, it
is merely another instance of the pull away from the pole of halakhah-aslaw towards the pole of halakhah-as-Torah,18 but insofar as it ascribes to
halakhah’s principles and structure a static and objective metaphysical reality that is discovered when it is “freed from the bonds of facticity, external and common-place explanations, and . . . transformed into abstract
concepts,”19 it aligns with prominent elements of Greek epistemology and
ontology. It is a stunningly radical departure from the rabbinic idea of law
14. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 205.
15. Id. at 206.
16. Id. at 20.
17. JOSEPH SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 5 (1983).
18. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 201.
19. R. Joseph Soloveitchik, Mah Dodekh mi-Dod, in IN ALONENESS, IN TOGETHERNESS: A SELECTION OF HEBREW WRITINGS 227 (1971) (describing his grandfather’s
method, as cited by Saiman, supra note 1, at 203).
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according to which halakhah is “from heaven but no longer in heaven,” a
divine gift that far from being objective, static, and beyond the reach of
humans, is only actualized when it reaches human hands and is applied to
particular, subjectively-experienced situations.20
Chaim Saiman’s Halakhah is a masterful work and the academic discipline of Talmudic-rabbinic studies is the richer for its having been written.
The rabbinic idea of law that emerges from Saiman’s phenomenological
analysis is inherently engaging; in addition, when set alongside alternative
ancient cultural formations and their epistemologies, its distinctive features illuminate the foundational commitments at the heart of the rabbis’
intellectual universe.
20. This characterization of the rabbinic approach, demonstrated in countless legal discussions and determinations on every page of the Talmud, is not obviated by a handful of hyperbolic references to a pre-existent (but nevertheless
divinely-created) Torah consulted by God when creating the world. See Genesis Rabbah 1 and 8.
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